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Extension of the Federal Communications
Commission's Jurisdiction to the
Television Networks
By

LANCE

S.

DAVIDSON*

I
Introduction
The extent to which the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has jurisdiction to regulate the television broadcasting networks has been an unresolved issue almost from
the inception of the FCC's enabling statute, the Communications Act of 1934.1 Regulation of network enterprises 2-primarily ABC, CBS, and NBC-presents a particularly knotty
problem of jurisdiction for the FCC inasmuch as the Communications Act of 1934 grants the FCC no explicit jurisdictional
authority over them. No reference to, or definition of, "network" exists in the Communications Act despite the networks'
oligarchic presence in television broadcasting.3 Visceral reactions to the issue of network regulation range from support for
*
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1. 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (as amended in 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-757 (1978)) [hereinafter
referred to as the Communications Act].
2. The three major broadcasting networks are Columbia Broadcasting Systems
(CBS), the American Broadcasting Company (ABC), and the National Broadcasting
Company (NBC). The Commission had licensed 10,134 commercial and public broadcast stations by November 30, 1981; 7976 of that total were commercial radio stations
and 772 were commercial television stations. The major networks provide about twothirds of all programming aired by their television affiliates. See generally GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTING OFFICE REPORT B-131935, SELECTED FCC REGULATORY POLICIES:
THEIR PURPOSES AND THEIR CONSEQUENCES FOR COMMERCIAL RADIO AND TELEVISION,

C.E.D. 79-62, June 4, 1979. For a history of television broadcasting, see C.
KrrrRos, STAY TUNED

(1978); E. BASNoUW, A

STERLING

& J.

HISTORY OF BROADCASTING IN THE UNITED

(1966-70).
3. The FCC treats "network" as synonymous with "chain broadcasting" which is
defined in section 153(p) of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 303 (1976), as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more connected stations."
See FCC, REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING, Docket No. 5060 (1941). Chain broadcasting and networking are, however, distinct concepts.
STATES
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FCC licensing of networks to protect the public interest in
First Amendment values,4 to support for network self-regulation since FCC regulation would constitute illegal indirect censorship.' Because the FCC is without statutory authority to
regulate the networks per se, the FCC directly regulates broadcast stations by providing that a license will not be granted to
any station affiliated with a network that engages in certain forbidden practices.6 Through this mechanism the FCC has exerted indirect control over the television networks via their
affiliates.7 On October 18, 1979, for instance, the FCC cornChain broadcasting . . . involved transmission of occasional programs...
[by] a licensed station which made it available to other stations in the...
"chain" for simultaneous broadcasting.
Chain broadcasting quite rapidly evolved into network broadcasting which,
while it involves elements in common with chain broadcasting-principally
that of multi-market presentation through interconnection-is quite different
in concept and a much more comercially [sic] sophisticated function.
Networking was developed as a means through which a national advertiser
could arrange through a single source for national coverage for his product
message ....
In chain broadcasting the program was developed by one station for its own purposes and passed on through electronic means to others.
In networking the programs are chosen and provided by network managers or
advertisers ....
Bryant, Regulation of BroadcastNetworks, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 3, 5 (1970).
4. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969):
[T] he people as a whole retain their interest in free speech by radio and
their collective right to have the medium function consistently with the ends
and purposes of the First Amendment. It is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount. See FCC v. Sanders
Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470, 475 (1940); FCC v. Allentown Broadcasting
Corp., 349 U.S. 358, 361-62 (1955); 2 Z. Chafee, Government and Mass Communications 546 (1947). It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an
uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather
than to countenance monopolization of that market, whether it be by Government itself or a private licensee. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1
(1945); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964); Abrams v.
United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
5. In addition to violating the First Amendment such censorship would be contrary to the Communications Act. 47 U.S.C. § 326 (1976) states:
Nothing in this chapter shall be understood or construed to give the Commission the power of censorship over the radio communications or signals transmitted by any radio station, and no regulation or condition shall be
promulgated or fixed by the Commission which shall interfere with the right of
free speech by means of radio communication.
6. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(h).
7. Pursuant to § 301 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 301, the FCC is authorized to license broadcast stations which may then transmit their signal at a designated power within a particular band of the electromagnetic spectrum. Only a finite
portion of the spectrum is available for broadcasting by a limited number of licensees.
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menced an inquiry into network-affiliate relations dealing with
the assignment of six new television channels to communities
in New Jersey. The FCC sought to provide improved television
service to New Jersey residents and took three separate actions to do so, including requiring the networks to affiliate with
licensees in New Jersey.8 Less than 5 months later, however,
the FCC abandoned this rather direct approach; instead, the
Commission opted for the safer, indirect method of refusing to
license a New York or Philadelphia station affiliated with a network declining to affiliate independently with a New Jersey
station.9
Indirect regulation of the broadcast networks by the FCC
had its genesis in regulations upheld in NationalBroadcasting
Co. v. United States."° National Broadcasting confirmed the
validity of regulations applicable only to licensee radio stations
but targeted to foster competition among the national broadcast networks. Since 1943 the federal courts have recognized
the FCC's authority to issue regulations concerning licensees
as a vehicle to regulate the networks. In 1970, however, the
FCC promulgated rules" which directly regulated the networks. The FCC sought to exercise its authority over the television networks that have actually dominated the broadcast
industry for years and which the FCC perceived as having a
great impact on its mission to protect the public interest. For
8. The FCC (1) adopted a rulemaking notice proposing to add new UHF (ultra
high frequency) stations to six New Jersey cities; (2) issued a separate inquiry and
rulemaking notice to determine whether the FCC has the authority to require networks to affiliate with any UHF television station assigned to New Jersey and whether
other Commission rules constitute barriers to creating additional service to New
'Jersey; and (3) ordered that certain New York and Philadelphia television stations
submit proposals for further physical presence in New Jersey by establishing offices
and new bureaus with connection to the main studios. See FCC, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 16219 (1980); see also FCC Notice of Inquiry and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 45 Fed. Reg. 16230 (1980).

9. FCC NOTICE OF PROPOSED
No. 79-270, 4 n.6, FCC 79-668.

RULEMAKING AND NOTICE OF INQUIRY,

B.C. Docket

10. 319 U.S. 190 (1942). See note 53, infra.
11. See notes 82, 83, and 84, infra. All FCC rules regulating television network affiliation are specifically codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a)-(1). See, e.g., 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a)
(exclusive affiliation of station); § 73.658(b) (territorial exclusivity); § 73.658(c) (network affiliation term); § 73.658(d) (time commitment-station commitment of broadcast time); § 73.658(e) (right to reject programs); § 73.658(f) (network station

ownership); § 73.658(g) (dual network operation); § 73.658(h) (control by networks of
station rates); § 73.658(i) (spot sales); § 73.658(j) (network syndication and program

practices); § 73.658(k) (prime time access rule); and § 73.658(1) (one affiliation per
station).
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the first time, the Commission exercised express jurisdiction
over the television networks without resorting to licensee regu..
lation for indirect jurisdiction. 2 All rules withstood attack by
the networks in federal court. 13 As a consequence, the FCC
has gradually, by virtual fiat, carved out a jurisdictional basis
for direct regulation of television networks. Long-term acceptance of this extended jurisdiction appears threatened, however, in the wake of the FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (Midwest
II) 11 decision handed down by the Supreme Court. Midwest I
restricted FCC regulation of the cable television industry. The
FCC's jurisdiction over cable television-like that over the television networks-is not specifically granted in the Communications Act. By analogy, the Commission's jurisdiction over
the networks might now be successfully challenged.
This article examines whether the FCC's extension of jurisdiction over television networks is likely to withstand future
challenge in light of the rulemaking authority granted the
Commission in the Communications Act of 1934 and the evolution of federal caselaw in the area. The article argues that the
Act does grant the FCC implicit authority to regulate the networks and that the "reasonably ancillary" standard applied
by the Supreme Court to test FCC jurisdiction over cable television should also be applied to test broadcast network jurisdiction. Finally, the article concludes that the FCC can justify
its implied statutory authority as long as it continues to issue
reasonable regulations affecting the networks.
12. See notes 24-33 and accompanying text, infra. To see how the FCC interprets
provisions in the Communications Act to justify its conclusion that the Act grants it
authority to directly reach the networks, see FCC, MEMORANDUM CONCERNING JURISDICTION OF THE FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION TO REGULATE TELEVISION NET-

WORKS, Docket No. 12782, Sept. 20, 1968, FCC 68-959.
13. Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1970). See notes 88100 and accompanying text, infra.
14. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
15. In United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968), the Supreme
Court declared that the FCC's authority over cable television was "restricted to that

reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting." Id. at 178.
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II
The Communications Act of 1934
A.

Regulation Prior to the Communications Act

The Radio Act of 191216 was the first federal legislation
passed in the United States to regulate domestic radio. The
Act gave the Secretary of Commerce and Labor authority to
regulate radio broadcast transmissions and license broadcast
stations and operators. The burgeoning number of radio
broadcast stations in the United States, however, eventually
resulted in unacceptable radio wave interference. The Radio
Act of 192717 was passed by Congress to eliminate increasing
co-channel interference on broadcast frequencies of the electromagnetic spectrum. A new administrative agency, the Federal Radio Commission, was created by the Act and granted
broad licensing and regulatory powers.18 The Federal Radio
Commission was granted no direct authority, however, over
the two most important factors in the development of radio
broadcasting-advertising and chain broadcasting.19 The potential of network systems had not been fully recognized even
though interconnection service did exist when the Radio Act
16. Act of August 13, 1912, Pub. L. No. 62-264, 37 Stat. 302. Congress enacted the
Radio Act to fulfill its obligations as a signatory of the first international radio treaty,
the Treaty with Foreign Powers on Wireless Telegraph, April 22, 1912, 37 Stat. 1565
(1912). According to Exec. Order No. 2011, April 6, 1917, and Exec. Order No. 2605A,
April 30, 1917, the Act was not intended to regulated broadcasting. Actually, the first
regulation of radio use was the Wireless-Ship Act of July 24, 1910, 36 Stat. 629 (1910),
amended by Act of July 23, 1912, 37 Stat. 199. For a concise history of federal legislation, see BRYANT, Regulation of Broadcast Networks, 15 ST. Louis U.LJ. 3, 5-11 (1970).
17. Act of February 23, 1927, Pub. L. No. 69-632, 44 Stat. 1162.
18. For the Radio Act's legislative history, see, e.g., 67 CONG. REc. 5473-504, 5555-86,
5645-47, 12,335-59, 12,480, 12,497-508, 12,614-16 (1926); 68 CONG. REC. 32, 1034, 1411, 1704,
2556-80, 2750, 2869-82, 3025-39, 3117-24, 3257-62, 3329-36, 3569-71, 4109-55 (1926-27); H.R.
REP. No. 464, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926); S. REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
See also Bryant, Regulation of BroadcastNetworks, 15 ST. Louis U.L.J. 3, 9-10 (1970).
19. "Chain broadcasting makes possible a wider reception for expensive entertainment and cultural programs and also for programs of national or regional significance
which would otherwise have coverage only in the locality of origin. Furthermore, the
access to greatly enlarged audiences made possible by chain broadcasting has been a
strong incentive to advertisers to finance the production of expensive programs." FCC,
REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING 4 (1941), quoted in National Broadcasting Co. v.
United States, 319 U.S. 190, 198 (1943).
It is unclear whether chain broadcasting received its first impetus from demands by
advertisers for wider coverage or from pressure of local audiences seeking service
from New York. T. ROBINSON, RADIO NETWORKS AND THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 18
(1943).
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was adopted in 1927.20 Thus, the Radio Act of 1927 had no provision for the licensing of broadcasting networks even though
the network organization was a natural consequence of the
commercialization of radio and its evolution from a local to a
national communications medium. Section 4(h) of the Radio
Act 2 instead provided the Federal Radio Commission with authority to regulate chain broadcasting. The Radio Act's most
basic concept-preserved in the Communications Act of 1934was that a private licensee would operate a commercially competitive broadcast channel in "trust" for the "public interest."2 2
B.

The Communications Act of 1934

Congress broadened the scope of broadcasting regulation by
adopting the Communications Act of 1934. The Communications Act abolished the Federal Radio Commission and established the Federal Communications Commission to regulate
interstate and foreign communication by wire and radio, including telegraph, telephone, and broadcast. Many provisions
in the 1934 Act concerning broadcast communication had their
source in the Radio Act of 1927. Since its inception in 1934, the
FCC has possessed the sole authority to regulate, maintain and
develop this country's communications resources. 23 Despite
the rapid technological advances of the industry and the developing role of the electronic media in American life, statutory
authority to regulate broadcasting has remained substantially
unaltered during the FCC's 48-year existence.
The broad and vague touchstone of FCC regulation is the
standard of '"public convenience, interest, or necessity."2 4 The
Communications Act confers upon the FCC a comprehensive
mandate to "generally encourage the larger and more effective
use of radio in the public interest. ' 2 If regulation is in the public convenience, interest, or necessity, the FCC is charged with
20. See, e.g., 68 CONG. REc. 2881 (1927).
21. Presently Section 303(i) of the Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47
U.S.C. § 303(i) (1976)).
22. See Hearings Before the House Committee on Merchant Marine and Fisheries,,
68th Cong., 1st Sess. 8-11 (1924). See also FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S.
470 (1940); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 215-16 (1943); Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 386-92 (1969).
23. 47 U.S.C. § 301 (1976). For legislative history of the present Communications
Act of 1934, see, e.g., Hearingson H.R. 8301 Before the Comm. on Interstateand Foreign
Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934); S. Doc. No. 144, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934).
24. 47 U.S.C. §§ 303, 307(a), 309(a), 319(d) (1976).
25. 47 U.S.C. § 303(g) (1976).
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the "authority to make special regulations applicable to radio
stations engaged in chain broadcasting."2 6 The Communications Act further defines chain broadcasting as the "simultaneous broadcasting of an identical program by two or more
connected stations."2 7 "'Broadcasting' means the dissemination of radio communications intended to be received by the
public, directly or by the intermediary of relay stations. '2 8 In
addition, the FCC is empowered to "[m]ake such rules and
regulations, . . . not inconsistent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of [the Act] .. ."29 Section
303(i), empowering the FCC "to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting,"
originates from Section 4(h) of the Radio Act of 1927.30 The
provision was originally introduced into the 1927 legislation as
a Senate Committee amendment to the House bill.3 1 The report of the Senate Committee on Interstate Commerce accompanying the amendment stated that under the bill the Federal
Radio Commission was given "complete authority ... to control chain broadcasting."3 2 The amended bill was passed by
the Senate and later emerged from the conference committee
to become the Radio Act of 1927. The conference reports offer
no reason for the changed phrasing but obliquely declare that
the Federal Radio Commission's jurisdiction conferred by the
conference bill substantially matched that conferred by the bill
passed by the Senate. 3 The language found in Section 303(i)
26. 47 U.S.C. § 303(i) (1976). "In actual practice, programs are transmitted by wire,
usually leased telephone lines, from their point of origination to each station in the
network for simultaneous broadcast over the air." National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States, 319 U.S. 190, 194 n.1 (1943).
27. 47 U.S.C. § 153(p) (1976).
28. 47 U.S.C. § 153(o) (1976).
29. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) (1976).
30. See note 17, supra.
31. H.R. 9971, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. (1926).
32. S.REP. No. 772, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1926).
33. See S. Doc. No. 200, 69th Cong., 2d Sess. IA (1926); H.R. REP. No. 1886, 69th
Cong., 2d Sess. 17 (1926). As for the Supreme Court's interpretation of this legislative
history, Justice Frankfurter wrote in National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319
U.S. 190, 221 (1943):
We agree with the District Court that in view of this legislative history,
§ 303(i) cannot be construed as no broader than the first clause of the Senate
Amendment, which limited the Commission's authority to the technical and
engineering phases of chain broadcasting. There is no basis for assuming that
the conference intended to preserve the first clause, which was of limited
scope, and abandon the second clause, which was of general scope, by agree-
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of the Communications Act of 1934 incorporated without alteration the phrasing from the 1927 legislation.
None of the television networks are themselves stations engaged in chain broadcasting although they do own licensed stations. 4 The networks are therefore not within the purview of
the Communications Act despite Section 2(a),3 5 which applies
to all "communications by wire or radio" and to "all persons
engaged within the United States in such communication or
such transmission of energy by radio. ' 36 Nonetheless, the FCC
has relied since 1934 on existing provisions in the Communications Act to justify the extension of its regulatory power to network practices. As broadcast stations have transferred their
principal programming responsibilities to networks, the FCC
has expanded the focus of its mandate to protect the "public
interest." Since the Communications Act makes no explicit
reference to broadcast networks as such, the FCC has identified the essential but minimal characteristics of a network as:
(1) affiliation arrangements with broadcast stations; (2) the
supplying of program service to such stations; and (3) the participation in these activities in the ordinary course of business
in order to coordinate these stations' broadcast of identical
programs.3 7 Thus, the FCC may attempt to regulate the networks only indirectly by its power to regulate licensees-which
includes the original grant, sale, renewal or revocation of a license-if the "public convenience, interest, or necessity"
would be served. 8 Section 303(r)3 9 supplements this statutory
authority by empowering the FCC to regulate licensees generally which may include denying a license to an applicant. Although television did not exist in 1934, the industry is deemed.
to fall within the Section 3(b)4 ° definition of "radio communication" in that it involves the use of transmitted radio signals.4 1
ing upon a provision which was broader and more comprehensive than those it
supplanted.
34. See note 3, supra.
35. 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976).

36. Id.
37. See, e.g., THE PRELIMINARY DRAFr REPORT BY THE NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL
STAFF OF THE FCC, THE HISTORICAL EVOLUTION OF THE COMMERCIAL NETWORK BROADCAST SYSTEM, Docket No. 21049, October 1979.
38. Federal Communications Act of 1934, 48 Stat. 1082 (1934), amended by 47 U.S.C.
§§ 303, 307, 309 (1976).
39. 47 U.S.C. § 303(r).
40. 47 U.S.C. § 153(b).
41. See Allen B. Dumont Laboratories v. Carroll, 184 F.2d 153 (3d Cir. 1950), cer:.
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The FCC is empowered to issue, in the public interest, regulations to carry out the Communications Act. Although the
grant of power seems clear, the Act provides only vague standards for regulation. Even though the Act makes no reference
to "networks," the FCC may regulate stations engaged in chain
broadcasting and thereby indirectly regulate broadcast networks. To understand how the FCC has expanded its statutory
authority to reach the broadcast networks requires an examination of federal court decisions interpreting the Act.

III
Evolution of the FCC's Extended Jurisdiction
Over the Broadcast Networks
A.

Expansive Powers

In 1938, the FCC engaged a wide-ranging inquiry into the
structure and operations of the networks.' The resulting Report on Chain Broadcasting 43 was released in 1941. The Report
highlighted network abuses resulting generally from restrictions contained in the affiliation agreements between networks
and stations. The Report also suggested measures to control
indirectly network practices in the radio broadcast industry.
The FCC emphasized that the chain broadcasting rules were
not an attempt to regulate the business practices of the licensees. The FCC insisted that it would exercise its regulatory licensing function only with due consideration to factors
affecting the station's ability to serve the public interest. Thus
a station's activities, if contrary to the public interest, would
not be immune from regulation, even if it could be considered
merely a business practice. Insofar as the contractual relationships between networks and their affiliates controlled what
programs the stations could broadcast, the FCC would, indeed,
regulate licensee business practices through these new rules.
denied, 340 U.S. 929 (1951). See also United States v. Radio Corp. of America, 358 U.S.
334 (1959).
42. Three organizations owned the then existing four national radio networks.
NBC, a subsidiary of RCA Corporation, operated the "Red" and "Blue" Networks; the
"Blue" Network was later divested by NBC and became ABC. The Chicago Tribune
owned CBS. R.H. Macy & Co. owned Mutual Broadcasting.
43. FCC, REPORT ON CHAIn BROADCASTING, Docket No. 5060 (1941) [hereinafter
cited as REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING]. For an exhaustive review of the events
leading up to the FCC's issuance of the Chain Broadcasting Rules and their subsequent effect on network practices, see Note, The Impact of the FCC's Chain Broadcasting Rules, 60 YALE L.J. 78 (1951).
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The policy of the rules was clear-the FCC would not grant a
license to any station owner who entered into a proscribed
agreement with any network." The FCC justified its promulgation of the chain broadcasting rules by declaring: (1) Under
the Communication Act, Congress had delegated to the FCC
the task of licensing stations in the public interest; and, more
specifically, (2) Section 303(i) of the Communications Act
granted to the FCC power to promulgate special regulations
45
applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting.
The rules adopted by the FCC provided that: (1) networks
could not bind affiliates' programming choices through exlusivity clauses 46 and option time clauses; 47 (2) the term of network
affiliation contracts was limited to one year;48 (3) the network
could not introduce any clause in an affiliate contract that
would give it the power to control station rates;49 (4) an affiliate
could not be prevented from rejecting any network program
that it believed was not in the public interest; 0 (5) chain
broadcasters were prohibited from owning more than one station in each market;" and (6) a standard broadcast station
could not affiliate with any network organization that owned
more than one networking operation.2 With the exception of
44. See Note, The Impact of the FCC's Chain BroadcastingRules, 60 YALE L.J. 78,
84 n.34 (1951).

45.

REPORT ON CHAIN BROADCASTING

at 80.

46. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(a) (1976) (television)).
The exclusive affiliation clause precluded an affiliated station from broadcasting other
networks' programs.
47. 6 Fed. Reg. 5258 (1941). An option time provision entitled a network to insist in
advance that an affiliated station broadcast sponsored network programming during
specified time segments. The rule was relaxed in FCC, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
CHAIN BROADCASTING 9 (1941), but option time provisions were completely banned in
1963. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(d) (1976) (television).
48. 6 Fed. Reg. 5258 (1941) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(c) (1976) (television)).
The term of affiliation was augmented to 2 years in FCC, SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON
CHAIN BROADCASTING 4 (1941).
49. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(h) (1976) (television)).
50. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(e) (1976) (television)).
51. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (codified at 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(b) (1976) (television)).
52. 6 Fed. Reg. 2282 (1941) (codified at C.F.R. §§ 73.636, 73.658(f) (1976) (television)).
The rules originally applied to radio networks and were extended to television in
1946. 11 Fed. Reg. 33 (1946). In 1977 the Commission repealed all of these rules as
applied to radio broadcasting except the rule on territorial exclusivity. Network
Broadcasting by Standard AM and FM Stations, 63 F.C.C.2d 674 (1977). An explanation
of all rules affecting television networks can be found in a PRELIMINARY DRAFT REPORT
BY THE FCC NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FCC RULES GOVERNING COMMERCIAL
TELEVISION NETWORK PRACTICES, Docket No. 21049, October 1979.
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the fifth rule, each of the rules regulated the networks only indirectly; their effect was to regulate the networks even though
specifically addressing their affiliates. It is even doubtful that
the fifth rule represented direct regulation of the networks
since it applied to the networks only in their role as licensees
of their owned and operated stations.
Challenges to the validity of the rules met defeat in National
Broadcasting Co. v. United States. 3 In the district court,
Judge Learned Hand broadly construed the last clause of Section 303(g) of the Communications Act of 1934 which authorizes the FCC to "study new uses for radio, provide for
experimental uses of frequencies, and generally encourage the
larger and more effective use of radio in the public interest."
Judge Hand wrote5 4 :
We can see no reason for confining the last clause to scientific or engineering problems; the purpose is apparent to give
the Commission power to foster the industry in all appropriate
ways. It is not clear that this was a new purpose; but if it was,
it infused the powers already granted in the earlier act, broadening them in accord with the changed outlook-the power
granted under subdivision "i" among the rest. The duty-for
the power imposed a corresponding duty-to "encourage" the
"larger" use of radio incidentally presupposed a power to prevent the frustration of the purpose so disclosed....
Hand next concluded that this duty of the FCC applied to the
exercise of its licensing authority, declaring, "[w] hatever may
have been the limits of the FCC's earlier powers, manifestly
after 1934 they included a consideration of how far licensees
might be improperly restricted in the exploitation of their
licenses."5 Finally, Judge Hand found that the FCC's chain
broadcasting rules were valid, despite the vagueness of the
Communications Act standard of "public convenience, inter'56
est, or necessity.
On appeal, the controversy culminated in a seminal opinion
by the Supreme Court on the issue of the FCC's jurisdiction
over the networks, National Broadcasting Co. v. United
States. 7 In addition to claiming that the rules violated the
First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, the
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

47 F. Supp. 940 (1942), affd, 319 U.S. i90 (1943).
Id. at 943.
Id. at 944.
Id. at 945.
319 U.S. 190 (1943).
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networks 58 presented two arguments that the FCC had overstepped its statutory authority. First, the National Broadcasting Company (NBC) contended that Section 303(i) of the
Communications Act, granting the FCC power to promulgate
regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain
broadcasting, authorized the FCC to regulate solely the technical aspects of chain broadcasting and did not give the Commission regulatory authority to adopt the chain broadcasting rules.
Second, the Columbia Broadcasting System (CBS) argued
that the FCC's licensing power empowered it only to evaluate
the technical and financial ability of the broadcaster to utilize
an allocated channel, not to control its business practices.
The Supreme Court, however, declined to adopt the restrictive construction of the Communications Act suggested by the
networks' arguments. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the
Court upholding the FCC's authority to promulgate the chain
broadcasting rules said5 1:

True enough, the Act does not explicitly say that the Commission shall have power to deal with network practices found
inimical to the public interest. But Congress was acting in a
field of regulation which was both new and dynamic. "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread fear that in the
absence of governmental control the public interest might be
subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcasting
field."

(Federal Communications Commission v. Pottsville

Broadcasting Co., 309 U.S. 134, 137). In the context of the developing problems to which it was directed, the Act gave the
Commission not niggardly but expansive powers. It was given
a comprehensive mandate to "encourage the larger and more
effective use of radio in the public interest," if need be, by making "special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in
chain broadcasting."
The Supreme Court thus concluded that Congress had granted
the FCC expansive powers to regulate the broadcasting industry, rather than limiting the Commission to specific and detailed powers. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Murphy
58. A summary of the contents of the briefs filed by the networks is contained in
the PRELiMINARY DRAFT REPORT OF THE NETWORK INQUIRY SPECIAL STAFF, FCC JuRis..
DICTION TO REGULATE COMMERCIAL TELEVISION NETWORK PRACTICE, Docket No. 21049,

October 1979.
59. 319 U.S. 190,218-19. The Court further confirmed the Commission's authority to
proceed against network practices which prevent the fullest utilization of radio in the
public interest regardless of whether the practices also violate antitrust laws. Id. at,
223-24.
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declared that the Act did not authorize the Commission's promulgation of the chain broadcasting rules.6 0 He viewed the
Commission's "authority to make special regulations applicable to radio stations engaged in chain broadcasting" as extending only to technical engineering problems and not
network business practices. Furthermore, the dissent was critical of the FCC's strategy of exploiting its licensing power to
achieve indirect control over network business policies. Although NationalBroadcasting approved indirect regulation of
the networks through control of licensees' affiliation agreements, the question whether direct regulation would be invalid
was not addressed.
In 1958, the FCC issued the Barrow Report6 1 which examined
television network practices, including network-affiliate relations, option time, network ownership of stations and network
influence on advertising revenues. 62 The Barrow Report contended that the existing chain broadcasting rules were
designed inefficiently because they held the broadcast licensees liable for practices within the networks' responsibility.
Although determining that FCC rules and regulations should
be applied directly to the networks, the Barrow Report concluded, "[I] n view of the administrative practice over the past
16 years of regulating networks indirectly and of the Commission's disclaimer in the past of power to regulate networks directly, it is submitted that the Commission should not directly
regulate networks unless and until the Congress expressly empowers the Commission to do so. ' 63 The Report based this
conclusion on the fact that Congress had denied FCC requests
for express authority to license or regulate networks since
1946.64
As a consequence of the Barrow Report recommendations,
the FCC promulgated rules requiring that network affiliate
contracts be made public,6 I banning option time,6 6 and prohib60. 319 U.S. at 230-31.
61. FCC, REPORT OF THE NETWORK STUDY STAFF, reprinted in H.R. REP. No. 1297,
85th Cong., 2d Sess., 628-30 (1958) [hereinafter referred to as the Barrow Report].
62. See notes 46-52, supra.
63. Barrow Report at 630.
64. See, e.g., H.R. 5042, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (entitled in part "A Bill to
Amend the Communications Act of 1934 to Subject Television Networks to Certain
Controls . . ."); H.R. 11340, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959) (entitled in part "A Bill to
Amend the Communications Act of 1934 ... to Provide for the Regulation of National
Networks"); S. 2400, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
65. 16 F.C.C.2d 973 (1969).
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iting affiliates from being represented by networks in the national spot advertising market.6 7 Four independently owned
affiliates and NBC, which sold non-network time for advertising as a representative for the stations affiliated with the network organization, contested the validity of the last rule in
Metropolitan Television Co. v. FCC.68 The U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia, however, rejected the
challenge. Citing National Broadcasting as the controlling
precedent, the court held that the FCC had the statutory authority to promulgate the regulation.6 9 Without any discussion
concerning the scope of FCC authority over networks, the
court relied on the Commission's finding that the network
practice of representing affiliates in sales of non-network advertising time restricted licensee freedom. The court further
held that the regulation was a reasonable exercise of the FCC's
rulemaking authority, flowing from its mandate to protect the
"public convenience, interest, or necessity. ' 70 It is unclear
whether the court would have been as reluctant to disturb the
FCC's rule had it directly regulated the networks without relying on FCC licensing power over network affiliates.
B. Developing the "Reasonably Ancillary" Standard of Jurisdiction
An important precedent was established when the FCC won
a 1968 jurisdictional battle against the cable television 71 industry in United States v. Southwestern Cable Co. 72 Because the
Communications Act preceded the development of the cable
industry (as it did with that of the television industry), the
Communications Act never specifically authorized the FCC to
66. 34 F.C.C. 1103 (1963).
67. 27 F.C.C. 697 (1959).
68. 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
69. Id. at 876.

70. Id.
71. "Cable Television" is a term more specifically applied to cable systems which

originate, or "cablecast," their own programs in competition with broadcast television.
For cable systems not providing these services, the term "CATV" is used to describe
those systems which do not directly make use of the broadcast spectrum that has been
allocated for radio and television. These systems simply retransmit conventional television by means of coaxial cable which is linked to individual television sets, thereby
eliminating the over-the-air radio wave. The unique factor of CATV is the capacity for
many channels on a single cable. For a simple but complete discussion of CATV technology, see SLOAN COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE-THE TEL:VISION OF ABUNDANCE (1971).
72. 392 U.S. 157 (1968). No dissents and only one concurrence were filed in this
important case.
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regulate cable television. While the Communications Act established the FCC's power to control access to and use of the
broadcast spectrum which was used indirectly by certain aspects of cable television, the Commission was without the express authority necessary to discharge its broadcast duties in
the regulation of cable television systems." Initially, the Commission disclaimed any regulatory authority to make rules concerning cable television 4 and therefore sought, unsuccessfully,
explicit authority from Congress.7 5 The FCC reversed its previous stance in 1966, however, and issued rules concerning
cable systems' carriage of signals broadcast by station licensees.7 6 Although importing broadcast signals from licensed
broadcast stations, cable television systems affected by these
rules were not themselves required to obtain FCC licenses.
Predictably, the FCC's authority to issue cease and desist orders pursuant to these new rules was immediately challenged
in Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States.7 7 The Ninth Circuit held that while all authority of the FCC need not be found
in explicit language of the Communications Act, the FCC must
conform with the terms, policies and purposes of the Act.78 As
support for its interpretation of the scope of agency power, the
court cited an earlier Supreme Court decision 79 :
As an administrative body, the Commission must find its
powers within the compass of the authority given it by Congress .... These cases (FCCv. Sanders Bros. Radio Station,
309 U.S. 470, 60 S.Ct. 693, 84 L. Ed. 869 (1940); National Broadcasting Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 63 S.Ct. 997, 87 L. Ed.
1344 (1943)) make clear that the Commission's regulatory powers center around the grant of licenses. They contain no reference to any sanctions, other than refusal or revocation of a
license, that the Commission may apply to enforce its decisions. 338 U.S. at 597-599, 70 S.Ct. at 376 (footnotes omitted).
73. Id. at 176-177.
74. See Memorandum Opinion and Order, 24 F.C.C. 251, 253-55 (1958).
75. See S.REP. No. 923, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. (1959); and H.R. No. 6840, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961), reconsidered in Hearingson H.R. 7715 Before the Subcomm. on Communications and Power of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce,
89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965); Hearings on H.R. 12914, H.R. 13286, and H.R. 14201 Before
the House Committee on Interstateand Foreign Commerce, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).

76. 2 F.C.C.2d 725 (1966). FCC jurisdiction for issuance of the rules was based on
47 U.S.C. § 152(a) which provides that provisions of the Communications Act of 1934
will be applied to all "interstate and foreign communication by wire or radio."
77. 378 F.2d 118 (9th Cir. 1967), rev'd, 392 U.S. 157 (1968).
78. 378 F.2d at 122-123 (1967).
79. Regents of University System of Georgia v. Carroll, 338 U.S. 586 (1950).
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On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed the Court of Ap.peals. The Court construed the Communications Act as expansively in Southwestern Cable as it had in the National
Broadcastingcase and held that the FCC had the authority to
issue signal carriage rules. The Court concluded that the FCC
did have the authority under the Communications Act to regulate cable television systems even though this authority was
not contemplated by the Act. Interpreting the legislative history and purposes of the Communications Act as an indication
that the Act was not to restrict the FCC's authority to those
powers specifically conferred in the Act, the Court held that it
"is enough to emphasize that the [Commission's] authority
...is restricted to that reasonably ancillary to the effective
performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for
the regulation of television broadcasting."' 0 The Court did not
view the Commission's earlier unsuccessful requests for explicit legislation authorizing cable regulation as dispositive8 1 :
The Commission's requests for legislation evidently reflected
in each instance both its uncertainty as to the proper width of
its authority and its understandable preference for more detailed policy guidance than the Communications Act now
provides.
The "reasonably ancillary" standard enunciated in Southwestern Cable allowed the FCC to assert the necessary authority
from existing provisions of the Act to promulgate regulations
"reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's other regulatory duties.
In response to the Court's approval of the Commission's assertion of authority over cable television, and concerned about
the broadcast networks' participation in syndication of nonnetwork programming and their domination of prime-time programming, the FCC in 1970 promulgated three rules regulating
network affiliation: the prime-time access rule, 2 the syndication rule,8 3 and the financial interest rule.8 4 This was the first
80. 392 U.S. at 178.
81. 392 U.S. at 170.
82. 47 C.F.R. § 658(k). Prime-Time Access Rule. Limits the networks from providing more than three hours of prime-time programming in the top 50 television markets
per night. This effectively freed up one-half hour per night for other program
suppliers.
83. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(1)(j)(i) provides:
[N]o television network shall ... sell, license, or distribute television programs to television station licensees within the United States for non-network
television exhibition or otherwise engage in the business commonly known as
"syndication" within the United States; or sell, license, or distribute television
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time the FCC had promulgated regulations which substituted
the language "no network shall" for "no license shall be
granted to a television broadcast station." The financial interest and syndication rules were aimed directly at the major
commercial networks' relationships with program syndicates
(the affiliates were not parties to these relationships), thus
squarely raising the question of FCC authority to directly regulate network practices.
The three networks led the broadcast industry by challenging the 1970 network rules in Mt. Mansfield Television, Inc. v.
FCC,85 arguing that the FCC had exceeded the scope of its
statutory authority. After disposing with the First Amendment
issue raised by the prime-time access rule, the Second Circuit
enforced the FCC's conclusion that it possessed the requisite
authority to regulate network practices.8 6
The networks contended in their briefs 7 that a history of unsuccessful FCC attempts to obtain enabling legislation, coupled with the FCC's own admissions that it lacked power to
regulate the networks, indicated a lack of authority to promulgate the rules. CBS argued that National Broadcastingwas of
limited precedential value since the syndication and financial
interest rules did not deal with broadcasting functions as did
the previous rules addressing the network-licensee relationship.8 8 CBS further argued that Southwestern Cable was inapposite because, unlike the 1970 rules, the Commission's signal
carriage regulations were designed for an expanding technolprograms of which it is not the sole producer for exhibition outside the United
States; or reserve any option or right to share in revenues or profits in connection with such domestic and/or foreign sale, license, or distribution ....
84. 47 C.F.R. § 73.658(1) (j) (ii) provides:
[N] o television network shall... acquire any financial or proprietary right
or interest in the exhibition, distribution, or other commercial use of any tele-

vision program produced wholly or in part by a person other than such television network, except the license or other exclusive right to network exhibition
within the United States and on foreign stations regularly included within
such television network: Provided, That if such network does not timely avail
itself of such licensee or other exclusive right to network exhibition within the
United States, the grantor of such license or right to network exhibition may,
upon making a timely offer reasonably to compensate the network, reacquire
such license or other exclusive right to exhibition of the program.
85. 442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971).
86. Id. at 482.
87. See Brief for Appellant NBC at 37-39, Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470
(2d Cir. 1971); see also Brief for Appellant CBS at 59-62, Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. FCC,
442 F.2d 470 (2d Cir. 1971) [hereinafter referred to as CBS Brief].
88. CBS Brief at 62.
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ogy which upset the FCC's allocation scheme and in turn
89
threatened the existence of free television.
In its brief the FCC denied9" that its jurisdictional authority,
to regulate the networks was limited to its licensing power..
Support for this argument was found in PhiladelphiaTelevi..
sion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC9 1 , where it was held that an
"agency is entitled to some leeway in choosing which [means]
will be most effective in advancing the Congressional objec.tive." 92 The FCC further stressed that the syndication and
financial interest rules were not invalid merely because they
directly regulated network practices. The FCC cited as support General Telephone Co. of Californiav. FCC,9 3 a District of
Columbia Court of Appeals decision which authorized FCC
regulation of intrastate common carrier service as integral to a
comprehensive regulatory scheme for communications":
[T]he Commission's regulatory and enforcement powers
should not be artificially fragmented or compartmentalized
when the result would be to frustrate a comprehensive, pervasive regulatory scheme.
The Commission relied on Metropolitan Television as authority for the FCC's power to regulate network business activities
unrelated to the chain broadcasting function.9 " The FCC also
relied on Southwestern Cable as an example of FCC authority
to regulate nonlicensees of the television industry.
The Second Circuit Court relied heavily on the National
Broadcasting and Southwestern Cable decisions to hold that
the FCC did have the authority to regulate network activity despite the absence of an explicit statutory provision. In determining whether the FCC may regulate network activities when
it believes that these activities would interfere with the ability
of its licensees to operate in the public interest, the court recognized that "[a] lthough all of the regulations sustained in the
National Broadcasting Company case were phrased in terms
of the Commission's power to refuse licenses, the practical limitations on network policies and practices were apparent to the
89. CBS Brief at 62-64.
90. See Brief for Appellee FCC at 35, Mt. Mansfield TV, Inc. v. FCC, 442 F.2d 470 (2d
Cir. 1971).
91. 359 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
92. Id. at 284.
93. 413 F.2d 390 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 888 (1969).
94. Id. at 402.
95. 289 F.2d 874 (D.C. Cir. 1961).
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Court."9 6 Having acknowledged the Commission's authority to
indirectly regulate the networks, the Court of Appeals then
specifically approved the FCC's authority to directly regulate
the networks 97:

The syndication and financial interest rules, though direct
regulations of networks, as well as the prime time access rule,
are within the Commission's statutory power if they are "reasonably ancillary to the effective performance of the Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television
broadcasting." United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392
U.S. 157, 178.
The fact that the FCC had previously disclaimed any authority to regulate the networks was disregarded in assessing the
absence of such authority in the Act. 8 Instead, the court found
that the effect and purpose of the rules were consistent with
the Act's policies and that, therefore, the Communications Act
of 1934 granted the FCC ample authority to adopt the rules. 9
The court further concluded that the 1970 rules were not arbitrary or capricious but that the evidence demonstrated instead
that the rules were a rational exercise of FCC authority to remedy network practices which the Commission had determined
to be contrary to the public interest.10 0
C. Narrowing the "Reasonably Ancillary" Standard
Three decisions which addressed the scope of FCC jurisdiction over the cable television industry could also affect the
FCC's jurisdiction over the television networks. Although the
96. 442 F.2d at 480.
97. 442 F.2d at 481. Only a few years later, however, in Accuracy in Media, Inc. v.
FCC, 521 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1975), wherein the court agreed with the FCC that it had no
jurisdiction over the Corporation for Public Broadcasting in the Public Broadcasting
Act of 1967, 47 U.S.C. § 396(g) (1) (A), the same circuit court declared:
[A] ssertions of "jurisdiction" over networks are really no more than claims of
expansive authority over the owned or affiliated individual licensees. In no
case has the FCC taken direct jurisdiction over a network ....
Id. at 294.
98. 442 F.2d at 480.
99. At least one author suggests that the court misinterpreted the Act to justify its
holding: 47 U.S.C. § 313 provides for license revocation should a licensee be found
guilty of an antitrust law violation. The court, however, found that 47 U.S.C. § 313 specifically authorized the Commission to deal with the problem of network dominance
and that 47 U.S.C. § 303(r) granted the Commission power to adopt rules necessary to
carry out the purposes of the Act. 442 F.2d at 481. See Schuessler, FCC Regulationof
the Network Television Program Procurement Process: An Attempt to Regulate the
Laws of Economics?, 73 Nw. U.L. REv. 227 (1978).
100. 442 F.2d at 483-87.
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"reasonably ancillary" standard had been applied broadly to
expand FCC jurisdiction in Southwestern Cable, the Supreme
Court decisions in United States v. Midwest Video Corp. (Mid..
west 1) 101 and FCC v. Midwest Video Corp. (MidwestH) 102 and

the decision of the Court of Appeals for the District of Colum..
bia Circuit in Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC 103 , have undercut
the Mt. Mansfield holding. In these decisions the Commission
was admonished that it could only promulgate cable television
regulations consistent with the express terms of the Communications Act and in furtherance of FCC policy objectives long
established in the field of broadcast television.
In Midwest I, Justice Brennan's plurality opinion relied on
Southwestern Cable to hold that an FCC regulation requiring
certain cable television systems to engage in program origination was reasonably ancillary to the policy objectives of the
Communications Act and was therefore within the FCC's jurisdiction. 104 The regulation subjected the systems' cablecasts to
FCC broadcast rules such as the fairness doctrine. 105 Since the
purpose of the regulation was to provide cable television viewers with diversified programming and enhanced local service,
however, the Court found the rules reasonably ancillary to
the FCC's broadcast duties.0 6 Commenting on the Commission's jurisdiction, the Court noted that "regulatory authority
over [cable television] is imperative if [the FCC] is to perform
with appropriate effectiveness certain of its other
responsibilities."' 07
The Southwestern Cable "reasonably ancillary" standard
was viewed as permitting cable telvision regulation "not
merely to protect but to promote the objectives for which the
Commission had been assigned jurisdiction over broadcasting.' ' l10

The Court then found that the origination require-

101. 406 U.S. 649 (1971).
102. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
103. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
104. 406 U.S. 640, 670 (1972).
105. See First Report and Order, 20 F.C.C.2d at 223-25. The FCC had adopted a rule
providing that no cable television system with 3,500 or more subscribers shall carry a
television broadcast station's signal unless the system generally operates as a local
cablecasting outlet and has facilities to produce and present local programs. 20
F.C.C.2d 201 (1971).
106. 406 U.S. at 669.
107. Id. at 661 (quoting United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157, 173
(1968)).
108. Id. at 667.
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ments fell within Southwestern Cable's "reasonably ancillary"
standard because they "further[ed] the achievement of long
established regulatory goals in the field of television broadcasting by increasing the number of outlets for community self-expression and augmenting the public's choice of programs and
types of services. . .10

The Court declared that it would not

interfere with the FCC regulation as long as the Commission's
objective was permissible under the Communications Act and
supported by substantial evidence.'
In his concurring opinion, however, Chief Justice Burger called for a "comprehensive
re-examination of the statutory scheme""' by the legislative
branch since "the Commission's position strains the outer limits of even the open-ended and pervasive jurisdiction that has
12
evolved by the decisions of the Commission and the courts."
Dissents were filed by four Justices charging that the program origination requirement compelled the cable operator,
against his will, to become a broadcaster:
The plurality opinion performs the legerdemain by saying
that the requirement of [cable television] orgination is "reasonably ancillary" to the Commission's power to regulate television broadcasting .... The fact that the Act directs the

Commission to encourage the larger and more effective use of
radio in the public interest, 47 U.S.C. § 303(g), relates to the
objectives of the Act and does not grant power to compel people to become broadcasters anymore than it grants the
power
3
to compel broadcasters to become CATV operators."
Therefore, the dissenters observed, the effect of the holding in
Midwest I was to give the Commission more power over cable
television under the "reasonably ancillary" standard than the
agency had4 over broadcast television under the Communications Act."
In 1975, the FCC introduced rules which restricted the types
of programming a cable system could carry because the Commission desired to prevent cable systems from "siphoning"
away programs from conventional television broadcasters.
These rules limited the percentage of total programming which
109. Id. at 667-68.
110. Id. at 673. Use of the substantial evidence test in Midwest I was criticized in K.
DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF THE SEVENTIES § 29.01-2 (1976).

111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 676.
Id. at 675.
406 U.S. 649, 677-81.
406 U.S. at 681.
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a cable system could devote to feature films and sports events
and restricted the carrying of series-type programs." 5 This
programming did not use the broadcast spectrum since it
originated with and was transmitted via wire by the cable operator. Yet the FCC asserted jurisdiction for the new rules by
finding that cable systems originating such programming were
engaged in "interstate communications by wire" and were
therefore subject to the Commission's
authority under Section
6
1 of the Communications Act."
The District of Columbia Circuit Court reaffirmed in Home
Box Office, Inc. v. FCC" 7 that the FCC could assert jurisdiction
over cable television under the Communications Act, but held
that the FCC could not promulgate the contested rules without
first demonstrating that it was advancing some regulatory policy either set forth in the Act itself or recognized as a long-established goal in the field of broadcasting." 8 The court found
that the FCC had exceeded its jurisdiction since it could not
meet the standard of "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction developed in Southwestern Cable and Midwest I. The court observed that FCC policy was to avoid regulating the program
format of the broadcast television industry's programming
since the Commission regarded such regulation as beyond its
authority under the Act." 9 Therefore, the court reasoned, the
FCC was similarly without authority to promulgate anti-siphoning rules which regulated the program content of the!
115. See Memorandum Opinion & Order, 23 F.C.C.2d 825, 830-31 (1970). The rules
prohibited a cable system from cablecasting live sports events broadcast by conven..
tional television within 2 prior years, from carrying feature films in general release for
more than 2 years (but less than 10 years), and from carrying advertising on cable
channels for which a separate fee was charged. According to the FCC, the thrust of the
rules was to protect conventional broadcasting television because it is the superior
form of television service and these rules served to maintain program quality on conventional television. See Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9,28-29 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
116. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976). 47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (1976) provides that provisions of the
Communications Act will be applied to all interstate communications by wire.
117. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977). Home Box Office, Inc.
had petitioned the FCC to waive the restrictions so that it could supply a film, for
which it had acquired cable rights, to cablecasters. The FCC refused to grant the
waiver absent a showing that the public interest would benefit, despite Home Box Office's contention that broadcast television viewers could still see the film since the
American Broadcasting Co. had previously secured the broadcast rights to the film.
See Home Box Office, Inc., 51 F.C.C.2d 317 (1975).
118. Id. at 28.
119. Id. at 31.
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cable television industry. 120 The court further held that the
rules unjustifiably impaired cablecasters' First Amendment
rights since they restricted the programming available to the
cable systems. 121 Finally, the court held that the rules were an
arbitrary exercise of FCC authority. 122 Thus a tighter rein was
drawn by the Home Box Office court on the FCC's ancillary jurisdiction over cable television by requiring that FCC cable
to those of judicially valiregulations promote goals parallel
1 23
dated broadcast regulations.

In 1979, the Supreme Court held in FCC v. Midwest Video
Corp. (Midwest 11)124 that the FCC had exceeded its authority
by issuing regulations 125 requiring certain cable television enterprises to develop a minimum channel capacity and to make
channels, equipment, and facilities accessible to third parties.
The FCC had sought to compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated programs, despite the fact
that the Communications Act expressly prohibits deeming one
engaged in radio broadcasting a common carrier. 26 Justice
White's opinion distinguished the Midwest II access rule from
120. Id.
121. Id. at 50-51.
122. Id. at 40. Since there was no evidence in the record supporting the need for
promulgating anti-siphoning rules for pay cable television, the regulations were invalid
under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 553, 706 (1970).
123. The court treated the jurisdictional issue, however, as primarily an evidentiary
matter.
[W] e hold today that the Commission has not established its jurisdiction on
[A] t a minimum the Commission, in develthe record evidence before it ....
oping its cable television regulations, [must] demonstrate that the objectives
to be achieved by regulating cable television are also objectives for which the
Further,
Commission could legitimately regulate the broadcast media ....
we require that the Commission state clearly the harm which its regulations
seek to remedy and its reasons for supposing that this harm exists. Because
our holding is so limited, it is possible that the Commission will, after remand,
be able to satisfy the jurisdicitonal prerequisites for regulating pay cable
television.
Id. at 34.
124. 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
125. 47 C.F.R. §§ 76.252, 76.254, 76.256. These access rules required the cable system
to provide use of the access channels on a nondiscriminatory basis and without editorial rights over the content of the access programs.
126. Section 3(h) of the Communications Act of 1934 (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 153(h)).
It is true that cable television generally is a hybrid of broadcasting and common carrier
but the legislative history of Section 3(h) refers to broadcasters as licensees. See Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National Committee, 412 U.S. 94, 105 (1973).
The FCC is without licensing power over cable systems. Instead, it issues permits to
construct microwave radio communications systems which transmit broadcast signals
to cable systems, pursuant to Section 307(b) of the Act (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 307(b)).
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the origination rule validated in Midwest I, on the grounds that
the latter rule did not compel public access or abrogate the
broadcasters' control over the selection of program content.
On the other hand, White found that the Midwest II access rule
contravened the intent of the Communications Act which was
to prohibit treatment of broadcasters as common carriers and
to preserve journalistic discretion over programming. 127 The
Court found that the FCC's rules to promote diversity and local
expression were not "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's effective regulation of television broadcasting. The Court also
found that the rules were not within the FCC's statutory authority under the Communications Act and "that recognition of
agency jurisdiction to promulgate the access rules would require an extension of this Court's prior decisions.' 1 28 The majority concluded:
The Commission may not regulate cable systems as common
carriers, just as it may not impose such obligations on television broadcasters. We think authority to compel cable operators to provide common carriage of public-originated
129
transmissions must come specifically from Congress.
Justice Stevens' dissent pointed out that this type of common carrier regulation did not violate the Communications
Act. Noting that § 3(h) of the Act is a definitional section
which does not limit the Commission's authority to impose
common-carrier obligations on cable systems, Justice Stevens
declared that the majority had misread the statute. 3 0 Furthermore, "the construction of a statute by those charged with its
execution should be followed unless there are compelling indi.Of course, a cable system originating its own programs does not use the broadcast
spectrum and is therefore not engaged in broadcasting.
127. 440 U.S. at 705. The Court stated:
The language of section 3(h) is unequivocal; it stipulates that broadcasters
shall not be treated as common carriers. As we see it, 3(h), consistently with
the policy of the Act to preserve editorial control of programming in the licensee, forecloses any discretion in the Commission to impose access requirements amounting to common carrier obligations on broadcast systems. The
provision's background manifests a congressional belief that the intrusion
worked by such regulations on the journalistic integrity of broadcasters would
overshadow any benefits associated with the resulting public access. It is difficult to deny, then, that forcing broadcasters to develop a "nondiscriminatory
system for controlling access ... is precisely what Congress intended to avoid
through § 3(h) of the Act.
128. 440 U.S. at 700.
129. 440 U.S. at 708-09.
130. 440 U.S. at 710-11.

No. 21

FCC AND TV NETWORKS

cations that it is wrong. ' 131

IV
Protection of the FCC's Jurisdiction Under the
Communications Act
A.

Sufficiency of Implicit Rulemaking Power Under the
Communications Act

Boundaries of FCC authority under the Communications Act
to regulate the broadcast networks have remained flexible and
indiscrete as a result of changing judicial pronouncements.
When the Commission has promulgated regulations which indirectly regulated the networks they have been held consistent
with authority explicitly granted in the Communications Act.
Such regulations were sustained in National Broadcasting,
Metropolitan Television, and Mt. Mansfield. Even when the
FCC promulgated regulations which directly regulated the networks, such regulations were upheld in Mt. Mansfield. Yet the
Communications Act offers no support for FCC jurisdiction to
regulate the networks. The FCC's extended jurisdiction is instead essayed by the courts in light of the FCC's duty to observe the "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard
embodied in Section 303 of the Communications Act.
The Supreme Court held in Southwestern Cable that despite
the FCC's lack of direct statutory authority over certain aspects of television, the Commission does have jurisdiction to
adopt regulations "reasonably ancillary" to the effective regulation of television broadcasting. The Supreme Court initially
employed the "reasonably ancillary" standard to expand FCC
jurisdiction but has recently used the test to restrict the
agency's authority. In Southwestern Cable and Midwest I the
Supreme Court observed that the legislative history of the
Communications Act indicated the Congress' intent to grant
the FCC broad powers to further statutory policies. A clear
policy of the Communications Act was to repose in the FCC
regulatory authority over broadcast and wire communications
to insure controlled use of the public airwaves and of the developing telephone and telegraph systems. 132 This authority con131. 440 U.S. at 711 (quoting Columbia Broadcasting System v. Democratic National
Committee, 412 U.S. 94 (1973) and Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367
(1969)).
132. 47 U.S.C. § 151 (1976).
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templated the entire communications industry then existing in
1934. The Supreme Court in 1968 and again in 1972 construed
Section 2(a) of the Communications Act as granting the FCC
jurisdiction over cable television "reasonably ancillary" to the
FCC's effective regulation of television broadcasting.'33 The
Court deferred to the FCC's judgment that FCC objectives
were reasonable and consistent with purposes expressed in
the Act.
In Midwest II, however, the Court further required consistency with the express terms of the Communications Act in addition to the policies for which the statute was enacted. The
Supreme Court held that the origination rule in Midwest II violated 2(h) of the Communications Act since it treated cable operators as common carriers; that the rule promoted reasonable
FCC objectives was deemed insufficient. The Court denied the
FCC jurisdiction to impose upon the cable television industry,
common-carrier obligations which would restrict journalistic!
freedom and editorial discretion, particularly because the FCC
could not impose such rules on broadcasters. Midwest II thus
canalizes the line of Supreme Court reasoning developed in
Southwest Cable and Midwest 1.11 A rule's valid objective is
not per se sufficient to justify the regulation as "reasonably ancillary" to the FCC's jurisdiction. Midwest II indicates that the
FCC must employ means to achieve its administrative objectives that are not inconsistent with the express terms of the
Communications Act.
The "reasonably ancillary" standard should be the appropriate test for scrutinizing FCC attempts to exercise power over
television not expressly delegated in the Act, yet arguably
within its scope. That is, the FCC should have consistent "reasonably ancillary" jurisdiction to regulate cable television and.
network television. The "public convenience, interest, or necessity" standard is a measure only of policies the FCC should.
seek to achieve, not of the means to achieve them. The "reasonably ancillary" standard, modified in Midwest II, would require that all of the FCC's cable and network regulations, in
133. A proper reading of 2(a) indicates that the section does not grant regulatory
authority but instead delineates the scope of the Act. For the Supreme Court's treatment of the provision, see Southwestern Cable Co. v. United States, 392 U.S. 157, 169-74:
(1968); United States v. Midwest Video, 406 U.S. 649, 660-61 (1972).
134. A change in the composition of the Court may possibly be responsible for this
more restrictive interpretation of FCC jurisdiction.
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addition to its administrative objectives, be consistent with the
express language of the Communications Act. Since both industries can equally hinder "the effective performance of the
Commission's various responsibilities for the regulation of television broadcasting,"' 3 5 the FCC must have consistent jurisdiction to regulate the entire television medium. The courts
have developed the "reasonably ancillary" standard to extend
FCC jurisdiction beyond the Commission's explicit statutory
authority, which was restricted to licensees actually engaged
in broadcasting, to cable television. By implication, then, the
"reasonably ancillary" standard may in the future be applied
by the courts to test FCC jurisdiction for network regulation.
The Court developed in Southwestern Cable this "reasonably
ancillary" standard to deal with a new technology not envisioned in the Communications Act-cable television. Cable
television did not exist in 1934, and its technology has never
incorporated "broadcasting" as the term was originally used in
the Communications Act. Networks themselves are also not
actually engaged in broadcasting. 136 Their business practices
may, however, interfere with their affiliates' use of the public
airwaves reserved for broadcasting. The FCC's statutory authority does encompass a licensing power over such affiliates
in order to regulate broadcasting, and the FCC thereby indirectly regulates the networks. The FCC has no licensing power
over cable television, however, and must resort to direct regulation of the industry. Use of the "reasonably ancillary" standard would not necessarily extend the FCC's jurisdiction to
directly regulate the networks. Instead, the Commission could
continue to rely effectively on indirect regulation of the broadcast networks via their affiliates, while directly regulating the
cable television industry. Yet such regulatory means may in
the future be insufficient. The judicially created "reasonably
ancillary" standard, as yet unapplied to network television, is
still sufficiently broad in its scope to permit the FCC in the future to effectively regulate the television networks. Although
the "reasonably ancillary" standard represents an imprecise
boundary demarcating the extent of the FCC's authority, a
flexible standard is required for an evolving, dynamic communications industry.
Furthermore, the standard can be appropriately applied to
135. United States v. Southwestern Cable, 392 U.S. 157, 178 (1968).
136. See notes 34-41 and accompanying text, supra.
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network regulation without upsetting established communications policies. Still, against the background of congressional
de-emphasis on industry regulation,1 3 the FCC should prudently remember that its "regulatory responsibility ... in the
broadcast field essentially involves the maintenance of a balance between the preservation of a free competitive broadcast
system, on the one hand, and the reasonable restriction of that
freedom inherent in the public interest standard provided in
the Communications Act, on the other."13' 8
In general, the posture of the Supreme Court is fairly definite when reviewing the scope of an agency's jurisdiction.'3 9
The Supreme Court tends to defer to an administrative
agency's reasonable construction of a statutory term.140 The
Court will not overlook, however, the language, purpose and
history of the statute in deriving its clear meaning.14 Similarly, the Court may exercise less deference to an agency's
statutory interpretation of the scope of its own jurisdiction."4
In both Red Lion BroadcastingCo. v. FCC'4 3 and Southwest-.
ern Cable " the Court declared that compelling reasons are required to override an administrative agency's construction of
its enabling statute in order for an agency to achieve its ulti-mate purpose. The duty of a reviewing court is to insure that
the agency has not exceeded the bounds for the exercise of discretion fixed by Congress and that the agency has applied only
the statutory standards. As the Supreme Court recently noted
137. In the context of the communications industry alone (other industries include
trucking and airlines), see, e.g., H.R. 13015, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1978); S. 622, 96th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1979).
138. Zenith Radio Corp., 40 F.C.C.2d 223, 230 (1973), quoted in Home Box Office v.
FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 29 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
139. See, e.g., Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 197-98 (1962) (National
Labor Relations Board); American Trucking Associations v. United States, 344 U.S. 298,
309 (1953) (Interstate Commerce Commission); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390
U.S. 747, 776 (1968) (Federal Power Commission); SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978)
(Securities Exchange Commission).
140. Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402 (1941) is generally cited for the proposition that a
court, rather than exercising its independent judgment when reviewing an administrative application of a statutory term to undisputed facts, should affirm the administrative interpretation if it has a rational basis. See also Oilbertville Trucking Co. v. United
States, 371 U.S. 115, 126 (1962); Commissioner v. Duberstein, 363 U.S. 278, 289 (1960).
141. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. Daniel, 439 U.S. 551 (1979). Cf. General Electric
Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125, 140-45 (1976).
142. See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop of Chicago, 440 U.S. 490 (1979). See also FCC v.
Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979).
143. 395 U.S. 367, 381 (1969).
144. 392 U.S. 157, 177.
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in Chrysler Corp. v. Brown 145:
This is not to say that any grant of legislative authority to a
federal agency by Congress must be specific before regulations
promulgated pursuant to it can be binding on courts in a manner akin to statutes. What is important is that the reviewing
court reasonably be able to conclude that the grant of authority
contemplates the regulations issued. Possibly the best illustration remains Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion for the Court in
NationalBroadcastingCo. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190 (1943).
There the Court rejected the argument that the Communications Act of 1934 did not give the Federal Communications
Commission authority to issue regulations governing chain
broadcasting beyond the specification of technical, engineering
requirements. Before reaching that conclusion, however, the
Court probed the language and logic of the Communications
Act and its legislative history. Only after this careful parsing of
authority did the Court find that the regulations had the force
of law and were binding on the courts unless they are arbitrary
or not promulgated pursuant to prescribed procedures.
"Our duty is at an end when we find that the action of the
Commission was based upon findings supported by evidence, and was made pursuant to authority granted by Congress. It is not for us to say that the "public interest" will be
furthered or retarded by the Chain Broadcasting Regulations. The responsibility belongs to the Congress for the
grant of valid legislative authority and to the Commission
for its exercise." Id., at 224 ....
Whether a court should not substitute its own judgment as
long as the agency conforms to the general legislative intent is
less clear. The flexibility of FCC regulatory power is due in
large part to the flexibility of judicially imposed standards of
"reasonableness." If a reviewing court could reasonably conclude that the grant of statutory authority would contemplate
the regulation in question, the FCC regulation would presumably avoid being declared ultra vires, and therefore invalid.'4 6
The FCC has used its statutory authority judiciously to avoid
any Congressional activity to restrict its jurisdiction. 1 47 None145. 441 U.S. 281, 308 (1979).
146. It does not necessarily follow that a regulation is permissible merely because it
is within FCC jurisdiction. The Commission must also establish that the regulation
itself is reasonable and rests on substantial evidence. See, e.g., Home Box Office, Inc.
v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
147. Congress does not hesitate to clip the wings of overzealous federal agencies. A
very recent example is the restriction of Federal Trade Commission powers by Con-
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theless, the FCC has probed the limits of its authority in order
to regulate the networks absent Congressional legislation. Examples include the 1970 syndication and financial interest;
rules, and the FCC's recently abandoned decision to issue a
cease and desist order compelling the networks to affiliate with
New Jersey stations.14 This order would have been nothing
more than verbal manipulation of the terms "cease and desist"'
to directly require network action which the FCC does not
have the authority to compel. By substituting indirect regula..
tion for direct regulation, the FCC's handling of the network.affiliate inquiry represents a properly cautious approach to
controlling the networks. Although the inquiry is well within
previously contemplated authority, the recent Midwest II deci.sion may be interpreted as a signal to the FCC to use restraint
because of the analogous queswhen regulating the networks
149
tion of statutory authority.
The FCC's authority to regulate networks is therefore broad
but not plenary. The developing law suggests that the FCC
may continue to regulate network practices as long as the rules
are based on established objectives and do not violate express
provisions of the Communications Act or the Constitution.
Such regulations are not invalid merely because the hidden
purpose is to regulate the networks. Regulations must effectuate the Act's policy, however, for the FCC to insulate itself
from attack on jurisdictional grounds.
B.

Revision of the Communications Act Is Not Necessary

National Broadcasting was dispositive only on the question
of the extent of the FCC's indirect regulatory authority over
the networks. The FCC has nonetheless successfully attempted to directly regulate the television networks and may
again in the future. Jockeying for jurisdiction by the FCC begs
the question whether revision of the Communications Act of
1934 is necessary to enable the Commission to regulate effecgress, which was preceded by delays in budgetary authorization and appropriations.
See N.Y.. Times, May 29, 1980, at D3, col. 1.
148. See note 9, supra.
149. The Supreme Court has traditionally allowed agencies great latitude in the exercise of their powers granted by the authorizing statute. Midwest II is one of two
recent decisions to restrict an agency which has directly or impliedly exceeded a statutory limiation. In SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), the Court invalidated the SEC
practice of "tacking" summary suspension orders when the statute only authorized a
period "not exceeding ten days."
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tively the broadcast networks or whether the FCC's present
authority, as extended, is sufficient to achieve this objective.
Although the FCC has repeatedly attempted to acquire explicit
jurisdiction over the networks through legislative amendment,
FCC rulemaking in the field has apparently anaesthetized Congress from engaging in legislative action.
A likely explanation for Congressional inaction is that the
Congress has believed the FCC is already empowered with
sufficient jurisdiction to carry out the purposes of (or Congressional intent embodied in) the Communications Act and that
the Commission's jurisdiction need not be extended further.
Consequently, numerous bills to amend the Communications
Act in 1934 in order to directly regulate the networks have died
in Congress. 15 0 While seeking to obtain explicit statutory authority, the FCC has admitted its lack of jurisdiction in the
area of network jurisdiction'':
[Ilt should be pointed out that the authority of the Commission to deal with networks is rather limited. The Commission
has no jurisdiction over networks as such and the Commission
does not have authority to license or regulate networks. In attempting to cover problems which arise out of the relation of
networks to affiliates, the Commission cannot enact regulations which apply directly to the networks.
Congress has neither the expertise nor the desire to upset the
blanket of jurisdiction which the FCC, with the support of the
courts, has laid over the television broadcasting industry. The
FCC's enabling statute as a result has not been revised to address such an important aspect of the regulated industry.
Whether the Communications Act should be revised to provide the FCC express jurisdiction over the networks turns on
the legitimacy of the means available to the FCC to effectuate
policies set forth in the Act. The FCC must have the authority
to regulate future network practices which could conflict with
these policies. Yet the FCC regulations themselves must not
conflict with the Act. Through the exercise of indirect regulation of the networks the FCC has managed to avoid exceeding
its jurisdiction. If, in pursuit of the public interest, the Com150. See note 64, supra.
151. Communication to Honorable Edwin C. Johnson Chairman, Senate Committee
on Interstate and Foreign Commerce from the FCC, Feb. 15, 1949, 1 RAD. REG. (P&F)
91:131. See also Hearings Before a Subcommittee of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 515 (1959); S. REP. No. 1857, 86th
Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1960).

COMM/ENT

[Vol. 4

mission cannot effectively regulate the networks even via their
affiliates, only then should the Congress, it is argued, expand
the FCC's jurisdiction. The FCC otherwise could not fulfill its
statutory mandate to promote broadcast television if its regulation could not reach the source of the forbidden practice. Application of the "reasonably ancillary" standard to FCC
network regulation, however, would obviate revision of the
Communications Act in the foreseeable future. Just as the
standard functions to evaluate FCC regulations concerning
cable television, it could serve the same function in the context
of network television which is also unaddressed in the Act. Although the problem avoids a neatly packaged solution, the
public convenience, interest, or necessity-the touchstone of
the Act-must remain protected.

V
Conclusion
As the FCC continues to tread on a high-tension wire, other
administrative agencies can profit from the FCC experience by
avoiding a tug-of-war with their enabling statutes. The FCC
has managed to regulate the broadcast networks without express jurisdictional authority. More significantly, the FCC is
protecting the public interest through the judicious use of its
rulemaking authority. The current network-affiliate inquiry
represents a prudent approach toward improving television
programming in New Jersey. The recent Midwest II decision
indicates that the FCC ought to use restraint when regulating
the networks. The narrowed "reasonably ancillary" standard
applied in Midwest II to cable television regulation may be applied in the future to regulations affecting the broadcast networks. As cable television becomes more prominent in the
television medium, congruity would suggest a single standard
for both broadcast network and cable television regulations.
The FCC should have consistent jurisdiction to regulate the
cable and broadcast network industries in order to carry out
provisions of the Act. The Commission would have sufficient
authority to regulate the networks if the courts were to recognize the FCC's reasonably ancillary jurisdiction to protect the
public interest. Although FCC jurisdiciton over the networks
is nonstatutory, the FCC is unlikely to require explicit jurisdiction in the Communications Act as long as its regulations af-
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fecting the networks are reasonable and consistent with the
Communications Act of 1934.

